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Abstract  
We examine how openness interacts with the coordination of consumption-leisure decisions in 
determining the equilibrium working hours and wage rate when there are leisure externalities (e.g., 
due to social interactions). The latter are modelled by allowing a worker’s marginal utility of leisure to 
be increasing in the leisure time taken by other workers. Coordination takes the form of internalising 
the leisure externality and other relevant constraints (e.g., labour demand). The extent of openness is 
measured by the degree of capital mobility. We find that: coordination lowers equilibrium work hours 
and raises the wage rate; there is a U-shaped (inverse-U-shaped) relationship between work hours 
(wages) and the degree of coordination; coordination is welfare improving; and, the gap between the 
coordinated and uncoordinated work hours (and the corresponding wage rates) is affected by the 
extent and nature of openness.  
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1. Introduction 
One important stylised fact concerning the differences in the evolution of labour market outcomes 
(productivity, work hours, unemployment, wage rigidity) between the US and Europe is that while 
Americans work today about as much as in 1970, Europeans work much less.  This discrepancy has 
generated both academic and policy debates. A key question that has arisen is whether this decline in 
working hours in Europe is responsible for the slowdown in its labour productivity growth. In fact, 
over the last thirty years productivity per man-hour in Europe grew faster than in the US, but this 
growth was almost completely offset by the decline in the number of hours worked per worker, 
suggesting that Europeans have taken a good portion of their secular increase in income in more 
leisure, Americans in more consumption – see Alesina et al. (2005), Blanchard (2004) and De Grauwe 
(2008).  
How can the US-EU differences in hours worked per worker be explained?  One factor that has 
been considered is taxation, although evidence on the importance of tax changes is ambiguous. 
Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2008), among others, suggest that tax changes can account for a 
substantial part of the differences in hours worked between the US and continental Europe. Emphasis 
on the importance of taxation is also placed by Davis and Henrekson (2004).  Blanchard (2004) argues 
that high labour taxes only explain a fraction of decline in hours worked. At the very least, the tax 
channel does not appear to be robust: e.g., Scandinavians have higher tax rates and work more hours 
than people in Continental Europe.1 Rogerson (2007) and Olovsson (2009) argue that the elasticity of 
hours worked with respect to taxes depends on the way governments use their tax revenue, with high 
taxes causing large decreases in ‘market hours’ in those activities which have good non-market 
substitutes.   
Alesina et al. (2005) focus on the role of cross-country heterogeneity in labour market 
institutions in determining the observed differences in labour market outcomes. They point out the 
existence of a strong correlation between hours worked and the percentage of population covered by 
collective bargaining (less than 20% in the US and more than 80% in Sweden, France and Germany) 
and argue that lower work hours in Europe could be due to unions’ influence (facilitating hours-wage 
trade-off), as trade unions tend to respond to negative shocks by trying to protect employment levels to 
the detriment of hours worked – e.g., via work-sharing arrangements. As pointed out by Faggio and 
Nickell (2007), however, this story does not fit the case of Sweden where working hours per working 
age person are relatively high – despite a generous welfare state, high taxes and strong unions. Faggio 
                                                 
1 The explanatory role of taxation is also criticised by Nickell (2004) because of omitted variable bias, and by Alesina et al. 
(2005) as being at odds with the evidence on labour supply elasticity. Andersen (2009) argues that in Scandinavia the co-
existence of high tax burdens and high employment levels can be explained by the employment conditionality that 
characterises the social safety net systems. 
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and Nickell (2007) argue that a key factor that accounts for these stylised facts is the behaviour of 
unions: while in France and Germany they have responded to shocks by pursuing work-sharing as a 
means to protect employment levels, in countries such as Sweden their response has been one of 
coordinated wage restraints (reflecting also the internalisation of concerns about the country’s 
international competitiveness).2  Glaeser et al. (2003) and Alesina et al. (2005) suggest that cultural 
differences may also be at play, contrasting the ‘leisure culture’ of Europeans with the ‘workaholic 
culture’ of Americans – the latter resulting from puritan Calvinist heritage. Alesina et al. (2005), 
however, argue that the fact that as late as the late 1960s Europeans worked longer hours than 
Americans (and the lack of observed correlation between a Protestant heritage and hours of work 
across countries) suggests that this hypothesis would imply a reversal of cultures, and state that in 
Europe reductions in work hours might have triggered a social multiplier effect that has led to a 
stronger decline in hours and resulted in higher collective leisure.   
Glaeser et al. (2003) show that, in the presence of positive social interactions, strategic 
complementarities might arise between individual decisions which could in turn give rise to a social 
multiplier.  Most individuals value leisure time more if it is spent together with relatives or friends. An 
individual’s utility from leisure is thus subject to social interactions with other individuals, i.e., a 
positive externality exists whereby an individual’s utility from leisure is higher the higher is the 
number of people taking leisure.  Clearly, this poses a collective action problem whereby the 
coordination of individual decisions increases social efficiency. In the presence of a social externality, 
trade unions may act as coordinating agents. This gives a more nuanced view of the role of trade 
unions for resource allocation and welfare. Traditionally, attention has been focussed on the 
distortionary role of trade unions on the allocation of resources as they exploit their market power. 
However, when unions internalise the value of social interactions in leisure time, their overall effect 
on efficiency is in general ambiguous. Recently, this point has been made in several papers – see, e.g., 
Alesina et al. (2005). Put in this context, differences in hours worked between the US and Europe can 
then be at least partially explained by the degree to which this coordination problem has been 
overcome, and not as reflecting intrinsic differences between European and American workers 
regarding their respective desire for leisure. The stronger role of unions in Europe may have 
contributed to turn the leisure externality into lower work hours per worker in contrast to the US, 
where trade unions are much weaker and do not act as their European counterparts in this respect – see 
Alesina et al. (2005) and De Grauwe (2008).   
                                                 
2 Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2002) and Nickell (2004) offer evidence that the impact of taxation, unionisation and 
employment protection are mitigated by the degree of coordination of union activity. 
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In this paper we explore theoretically how the nature of openness and the degree of 
coordination of wage/labour supply decisions (e.g., as typically reflected in the nature of labour 
market institutions) might interact in determining equilibrium market outcomes – wages, factor 
utilisation, and hours worked. Specifically, we examine how the coordination of consumption-leisure 
decisions affects the wage rate and working hours when consumers/workers value social leisure (i.e., 
when a worker’s marginal utility of leisure is increasing in the amount of leisure taken by other 
workers) and how this relationship is affected by international openness which influences the 
availability of factors of production and, in general, the level of economic activity.  
 We develop a simple static general equilibrium model of a small economy in which 
international openness is reflected in different degrees of capital mobility. We capture the externality 
from social interaction by allowing the marginal utility of leisure to depend positively on the average 
leisure time and examine how coordination of individual decisions interacts with openness to yield 
different labour market outcomes in general equilibrium. Different countries are characterised by 
different degrees of coordination of labour supply/wage decisions that are related to the organisational 
forms of industrial relations – of which the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining is just one 
dimension.  Indeed, as it clearly emerges from the extensive literature in the area, the extent of 
coordination in labour markets relates to the degree of corporatism, a key aspect of which is that the 
unions (or, more broadly, interest-group organisations) pursue outcomes that are consistent with that 
of government (Pekkarinen et al, 1992).3 In this spirit, we consider different degrees of coordination 
where a coordinating agent (that can be thought of as a union or social planner) internalises: (i) the 
externality of leisure only; (ii) the externality of leisure as well as the knowledge of the partial 
equilibrium labour demand by firms; and (iii) the externality of leisure, firms’ labour demand, as well 
as broader macroeconomic constraints. We refer to these respectively as basic, intermediate, and full 
coordination and provide a comparison between the corresponding general equilibrium solutions and 
the solution obtained under no coordination.   
Our results suggest that, in general, (with and without coordination) a stronger leisure externality 
results in a lower labour supply and in a higher wage and that this effect is stronger when the leisure 
externality is internalised by coordination of individuals’ labour supply decisions. We show that 
coordination reduces equilibrium working hours and raises the corresponding wage rate. However, we 
find a U-shaped relationship between hours worked and the degree of coordination of labour supply 
decisions (and an inverse-U-shaped relationship between wages and the degree of coordination of 
labour supply decisions). This is consistent with the evidence on the higher work hours per working 
                                                 
3 In this context, the degree of coordination of decisions is quite distinct from that of wage bargaining centralisation and 
can be addressed even within a model in which unions, as wage setting agents, are not explicitly modelled. 
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age person in Scandinavian economies relative to less coordinated industrial relations systems in other 
Continental European countries. We also find that the gap between the coordinated and uncoordinated 
equilibrium labour supply (and the corresponding wage rates) is affected by the extent of 
globalisation. In particular, for countries that are net importers of capital (and have a positive trade 
balance) raising the degree of openness increases both the labour supply and the wage rate – although 
with intermediate levels of coordination labour supply may also reduce. Again, this is consistent with 
the fact that – as also pointed out by Faggio and Nickell (2007) – the Swedish social pact, based on the 
internalisation of concerns about the country’s international competitiveness, has resulted in wage 
moderation. Finally, we find that coordination is welfare improving and that stronger leisure 
externalities enhance this improvement.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 derives 
and compares the general equilibrium solutions under different degrees of coordination of the wage-
employment decisions. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The model 
We model a small open economy producing a freely traded homogeneous final good under a constant 
returns to scale technology with capital and labour (man-hours). The labour force and capital 
endowment are given exogenously. Labour is assumed to be internationally immobile and the extent 
of globalisation is determined by the degree of capital mobility4. Workers/consumers are identical and 
each is endowed with a fixed amount of capital and man-hours. The former is supplied to the capital 
market and the latter is optimally divided between work and leisure hours; the representative consumer 
maximises a utility function in consumption and leisure which captures the externality of leisure 
across consumers.  
 
2.1. Production and factor demands  
Denoting aggregate quantities of output, capital and man-hours by Y, K and H respectively, the 
production function is 1Y AK Hλ λ−= , where A is a scaling constant and 0 1λ< < . Given that all 
markets are perfectly competitive, factor demand equations are ( ) ( ) ( )1 d dw A K Hλ λλ −= −   and  
( ) ( )1 1d dr A K Hλ λλ − −= , where the superscript d denotes demand and w and r are respectively the 
                                                 
4 The international mobility of labour is insignificant relative to that of capital, and is ruled out here by assumption to 
simplify the analysis; allowing for labour mobility requires an infinitely elastic labour supply at the world wage rate which 
introduces some ‘indeterminacy’ problems that complicates the analysis. It is also plausible to conjecture that the social 
interaction effect may be weakened by labour mobility, to the extent that it might increase the cultural heterogeneity of 
workers. 
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price of labour and capital relative to the price of Y (P) – i.e., they are real wage and rent, respectively; 
since there is no money in the model, output is used as numeraire and P is normalised to unity.  
 Given that the labour force L  is fully employed, we write the above equations in per capita 
terms as: 
 1y Ak hλ λ−= , (1) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 d dw A k hλ λλ −= − , (2) 
 ( ) ( )1 1d dr A k hλ λλ − −= , (3) 
where /y Y L= , /d dh H L=  and /d dk K L= . By virtue of the constant returns to scale technology 
and perfect competition, the zero profit condition y wh rk= +  holds and a one-to-one correspondence 
between w and r,   
 ( )(1 ) / 1/ (1 ) /1r A wλ λ λ λ λλ λ − − −= − , (4) 
is obtainable from (1)-(3). 
 
2.2. Consumption and labour supply 
The representative worker’s/consumer’s preferences are described by a utility function which captures 
the benefits from social interaction. In the presence of social interactions in leisure, the marginal utility 
from leisure of an individual depends positively on the average amount of leisure of the individual’s 
peers.  Thus, there are strategic complementarities between individual actions (see for example 
Scheinkman, 2008) that, in this context, result in a social multiplier in the worker’s labour 
supply/leisure decision.  In general, we may postulate a separable utility function in consumption and 
leisure5, ( ) ( ), ,u v c e e β= + A , where c is consumption, e is leisure hours, e  is the reference group’s 
average leisure time and β is a parameter that measures the importance of social interaction in the 
preferences. We need v to be concave in c, A  to be concave in e and e′A  to be increasing in e . We also 
require the resulting labour supply function for the representative worker, ( )h h w= say, to satisfy 
( ) 0h w′ >  and ( )h w′  to be decreasing in β.  Specifically, to obtain closed form solutions, we assume  
 ( )ln  , 0, 0, 0 1u c e eβ α αγ μ γ μ α β−= + > > < < < , (5) 
                                                 
5 For similar specifications in the literature, see for instance, Alesina et al. (2005) and Groedner and Knieser (2006).  
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which can be shown to satisfy the required properties as long as the scale parameter μ satisfies 
1/ eμ >  .6 We normalise a worker’s total endowment of hours to unity and assume that e  is the 
perceived average leisure across all workers. Thus, denoting the representative worker’s supply of 
work hours by sh , the hours restriction is 
 1se h+ = . (6) 
 The internalisation of the leisure externalities in the time allocation decisions of individuals 
intrinsically rests on the coordination of individual actions.  This coordination can be thought of as 
resulting from the action of a collective agent – for example, a social planner or a trade union.  The 
nature and extent of coordination typically depends on institutional factors such as the nature of 
industrial relations and/or government policies. Given the simple setup used here we shall not model 
explicitly the coordinating agent, but consider nonetheless different cases corresponding to varying 
degrees of coordination of labour supply decisions – which can be thought of as reflecting the different 
degrees of corporatism characterising the organisational forms of industrial relations of different 
countries. 
 
2.3. Openness   
In order to assess the impact of ‘globalisation’, we invoke the small open economy assumption with 
free trade in the final good and some degree of capital mobility.  The latter is assumed to be governed 
by  
 *1 1 , 0
k r
k r
δ δ⎛ ⎞= + − ≥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,  (7) 
which for convenience is written in per capita terms, where k  is a worker’s/consumer’s  endowment 
of capital, with /k K L=  and /k K L= . This equation is commonly used in the literature and is 
consistent with the conventional portfolio approach in which the capital flow ( )k k−  is determined by 
the interest rate differential ( )*r r− , where *r  is the return to capital (the interest rate) in the rest of 
the world.  δ captures the degree of capital mobility: when δ = 0 capital is internationally immobile, 
k k=  and the supply of capital is restricted to the country’s endowment; δ > 0 corresponds to partial 
capital mobility where capital flows are directly determined by the interest rate differential rate; 
                                                 
6 The social interaction effect of leisure operates through e  and (β − α) determines the extent to which the marginal utility 
from leisure of an individual depends on the average leisure time enjoyed by others. Since α is kept constant throughout 
the analysis we refer to β  as the relevant parameter. While in some circumstances β≥1 may be plausible, it is not 
considered here so as to rule out any unfeasible behaviour.   
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perfect capital mobility is achieved as δ →∞, where *r r= holds and there may be capital in- or out-
flow. In this setup, therefore, δ can be thought as a measure of globalisation.  
 Since free trade in goods equalises the domestic and foreign price of output, we can continue to 
disregard the price level (keeping P =1). The following equations show, in per capita terms, the 
balance of payments condition under capital inflow and outflow (with partial capital mobility) and 
perfect capital mobility, respectively 
  ( ) *0; andy c r k k r r k k− = − − > > < , (8.1) 
  ( )* *0; andy c r k k r r k k− = − − < < > , (8.2) 
  ( )* *; and either ory c r k k r r k k k k− = − − = ≥ < . (8.3) 
 The representative consumer’s budget constraint corresponding to the three cases of capital 
mobility are   
  *; andsc wh rk r r k k= + > < , (9.1) 
  ( )* *; andsc wh rk r k k r r k k= + + − < > , (9.2) 
  * *; and either orsc wh r k r r k k k k= + = ≥ < . (9.3) 
It is worth noting that (9.i) can be obtained from the corresponding (8.i) and the zero profit condition, 
y wh rk= + .  
 
3. General equilibrium solutions  
Given our purpose, we focus on obtaining the general equilibrium solution for (h,w) and examine how 
it is affected by the extent of globalisation and the strength of the leisure externality, captured by 
parameters δ and β respectively.  To do so, we reduce the model to two equations in (h,w) by 
substituting for all other variables in the demand and supply equations for work hours. We then use 
these to examine the resulting labour market equilibrium and compare equilibria across different 
scenarios, i.e., no coordination and basic, intermediate and full coordination. 
 
3.1. Demand for work hours 
For any given dk , the partial equilibrium demand for labour is given by (2). From (2), using (4) and 
(7) and imposing the capital market equilibrium condition dk k= , we obtain  
 ( ) ( )
1/(1 ) / 1/ (1 ) /
*
1 1
1 1
A w A
h k
r w
λλ λ λ λ λλ λ λδ
−
− −⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
− −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.  (10) 
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 Equation (10) is the locus of all combinations of h and w which satisfy demand for work hours 
in general equilibrium. For given values of *r , k , λ and A (which are kept constant throughout the 
paper), the shape and position of this locus in the (h,w) space are determined by the extent of capital 
mobility captured by δ. Figure 1 illustrates this (all figures are presented in Appendix 1). As expected, 
the locus is downward sloping and convex, reflecting the existence of a trade-off between h and w.  
More specifically, a rise in δ rotates the locus anticlockwise at w= wˆ , the value of w that satisfies (4) 
for *r r=  and corresponds to the perfect capital mobility locus. Thus, ˆ ˆ( )w w w w< >  corresponds to 
* *( )r r r r> <  where there is capital inflow (outflow); at higher (lower) values of h, i.e. ˆ ˆ( )h h h h> < , 
there is capital inflow (outflow) since firms are willing to pay a relatively lower (higher) w and hence 
* *( )r r r r> < . To see the impact of δ, suppose that δ is small (the solid curve) and consider a point 
such as B where there is capital inflow, thus *r r> , ˆh h>  and ˆw w< . A rise in δ increases the inflow 
of capital for the given ( )*r r− . This raises the marginal product of labour and increases the demand 
for labour. As a result, a rise in δ rotates the locus such that it lies above (below) the original one when 
there is capital inflow (outflow).  
 
3.2. Supply of work hours and the general equilibrium solution 
We derive the supply of work hours under a number of alternative scenarios: (i) the absence of 
coordination among workers, with each individual finding her own optimal consumption and leisure 
taking e  as given; (ii) a ‘basic’ level of coordination of consumption-leisure decisions across workers 
by a coordinating agent – e.g., a trade union – that internalises the leisure externality by setting e e= ; 
(iii) an ‘intermediate’ level of coordination that internalises the leisure externality as well as the 
knowledge of the partial equilibrium labour demand facing firms (in an industrial relations context, 
this could be thought of as a firm-level wage setting union case); and (iv) a ‘full’ level of coordination 
that internalises the leisure externality, firms’ labour demand as well as broader macroeconomic 
constraints in general (this can be thought as the corporative ‘all-encompassing’ coordination case).  
These four different equilibrium regimes (henceforth respectively labelled with a subscript U, B, I and 
F) are derived in the following subsections under capital inflow and outflow respectively.  
 
3.2.1. Supply of work hours with capital inflow 
3.2.1.1. No coordination  
On the assumption that each consumer/worker takes w and r as given, the first order condition for 
maximising the utility function in (5) subject to the hours and budget constraints in (6) and (9.1), is 
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 ( ) ( ) 11 0w e h
wh rk
β α αγ
α μ − −− − =
+
 ,7 
from which the corresponding supply function in general equilibrium, 
 ( ) ( )
1
(1 ) / 1/ 1/
1 0
1
h
h k A w
ββ α
λ λ λ λ
γ
αμ
λ λ
−
−
−
−
− − =
+ −
, (11.1) 
is obtained if we set ( )1e e h= = −  and replace r using equation (4). This equation gives the locus of 
all combinations of h and w that satisfy the uncoordinated labour supply equation in general 
equilibrium with capital inflow. Figure 2 illustrates (11.1) and (10) in the (h,w) space. Whilst the 
labour supply locus is independent of the extent of capital mobility − as δ does not appear in (11.1) − 
the externality parameter β affects its position. In particular, ceteris paribus, a higher β, and hence a 
larger leisure externality, shifts the locus inwards to the left, as illustrated in Figure 2. This result is 
consistent with the existence of a social multiplier and can be explained by recalling that points on the 
supply locus correspond to the maximum utility. For any given point on the locus, ( )0 0,h w  say, 
consider increasing β. The first term on the left-hand-side of (11.1) is unaffected whereas the second 
term rises. Thus, with a higher β, ( )0 0,h w  is no longer optimum since it does not satisfy (11.1); w 
ought to rise above 0w  so as to equalise the two terms in (11.1) and to restore the optimality of 0h . Put 
differently, the second term captures the marginal utility of leisure which rises with β and induces the 
individual to work less for a given wage rate.   
 Figure 2 illustrates how the uncoordinated general equilibrium is affected by changes in δ and 
β.  For a given β, increasing globalization (i.e. a higher capital mobility and hence δ) increases the 
inflow of capital, raising the marginal productivity of and demand for labour. This is followed by a 
rise in both working hours and the wage rate, as illustrated by the movement from EU1 to EU2 or 
alternatively the movement from 1UE′  to 2UE′  in case of a larger β. If – for a given degree of capital 
mobility and an initial capital stock – the social interaction preference parameter β increases, labour 
supply reduces resulting in a higher wage and in a lower working hours, as shown by the movement 
from EU1 to 1UE′  or from EU2 to 2UE′ .  In summary, when labour supply is not coordinated, (i) 
comparing two economies with the same preference for social interaction, the one which is more open 
will have relatively higher wage and work hours; and (ii) comparing two economies with the same 
                                                 
7 For a given r, this equation yields the individual worker’s supply of work hours, ( )h h w= which satisfies ( ) 0h w′ >  
and ( )h w′  is decreasing in β.    
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degree of openness, the one with a stronger preference for social interaction will have a higher wage 
and lower work hours.  
  
3.2.1.2.  Basic  coordination 
The ‘basic’ level of coordination across individuals in deciding optimal wage-hours combinations 
involves internalising the leisure externality without taking into account firms’ behaviour and/or 
broader ‘macroeconomic’ factors.8 Hence, the utility function of the representative worker-consumer 
is obtained by combining equations (5) and (6) and letting ( )1e e h= = −  which is maximised subject 
to the budget constraint in (9.1). Eliminating c from the utility function using (9.1) yields 
( ) ( )ln 1u wh rk h ββ αγ μ −= + + − . The first order condition for choosing h to maximise u keeping w 
and r as given is  
 ( ) 11 0w h
wh rk
ββ αγ βμ −−− − =
+
, 
from which the corresponding supply function in general equilibrium, 
 ( ) ( )
1
(1 ) / 1/ 1/
1 0
1
h
h k A w
ββ α
λ λ λ λ
γ βμ
λ λ
−
−
−
−
− − =
+ −
, (12.1) 
is obtained by replacing r using (4). This equation is the locus of all h and w combinations that satisfy 
the coordinated labour supply equation in general equilibrium with capital inflow. This locus too is 
independent of δ (the extent of capital mobility) and comparing (12.1) with (11.1) shows that, relative 
to the uncoordinated case, coordination leads to a reduction in the supply of work hours at any given 
wage rate. This occurs because the internalisation of the leisure externality directly implies that the 
opportunity cost of work is now higher – which is evident by comparing the second terms on the left-
hand-sides of (11.1) and (12.1). As a result, the graph of (12.1) in the (h,w) space lies above and to the 
left of that of (11.1). Consistent with the case with no coordination, and for the same reasons, an 
increase in β shifts the supply locus to the left, except that the shift is now larger.  
 Figure 3 illustrates the general equilibrium with basic coordination, and compares it to the 
uncoordinated case.  For a relatively small value of β and a given δ, the effect of coordination results 
in a move from EU1 to EB1 (with low openness, i.e. small δ) or from 2UE  to 2BE  (with high openness, 
i.e. large δ).  Hence, introducing a basic level of coordination will result in relatively higher wages and 
                                                 
8 This scenario is considered as a benchmark and would fall somewhat short of the actions of a coordinating agent (such as 
a union) which, even at the lower level of coordination – the firm-level – would plausibly internalised the firm’s labour 
demand, as shall be seen in the next subsection.  
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lower work hours, and the impact on the latter is stronger the more open is the economy. As discussed 
above, coordination increases the opportunity cost of work and shifts the labour supply curve inwards. 
A higher degree of capital mobility will increase capital inflow and, by increasing the marginal 
product of labour, will result in a higher wage and in lower work hours. The fall in hours, given the 
leisure externality, will be higher under coordination than under no-coordination.  For a given β, the 
effect of increasing openness is qualitatively identical to the uncoordinated case. For a given δ, an 
increase in the social preference parameter β raises wages and lowers work hours. This is seen as 
moving from EB1 to ' 1BE  (with low openness, small δ) or from EB2 to 2BE′  (with high openness, large 
δ). Whilst qualitatively this result is the same as that obtained under no coordination, quantitatively the 
same change in β  generates a bigger impact when labour supply decisions are coordinated as seen by 
the movement from EU1 to 1UE′  or EU2 to 2UE′ , respectively. This result reflects the social multiplier 
effect triggered by the internalization of the leisure externality under coordination, with a higher β 
capturing a higher degree of complementarity between individuals’ leisure choice.    
 In summary, comparing two economies with the same preference for social leisure  and degree 
of openness (given δ and β), the one in which workers’ consumption-leisure decisions are coordinated 
will have higher wages and lower work hours. Also, starting with a low level of openness and a weak 
leisure externality (small δ and β): (i) raising the extent of openness (increasing δ) will increase both w 
and h in both economies; (ii) strengthening the leisure externality (increasing β) increases wage and 
reduces work hours in both economies9. 
 
3.2.1.3  Intermediate coordination 
If the coordination of workers’ consumption-leisure decisions is performed by a collective agent such 
as a union, it is plausible to postulate that the agent internalises available information concerning firms 
and the broader aspects of the economy that might impact on workers’ employment and income. The 
extent to which the available information is taken into account can be thought of as reflecting the 
degree of coordination characterising the country’s industrial relations system, with higher levels of 
coordination embodying a higher degree of encompassment of broader (macro) economic constraints.  
In this subsection, we shall assume that the coordinating agent internalises the information that firms 
pay workers their marginal product − i.e., equation (2) − but disregards how r and k are determined 
and thus takes these as given. If we thought of this agent as a union, then this case would correspond 
to firm-level unions. In this intermediate coordination case, the utility of the representative worker-
                                                 
9 Figure 2 shows the typical case in which a rise in δ  increases h more in the uncoordinated economy whilst a rise in β  
increases w more in the coordinated economy. 
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consumer is identical to that used in the basic coordination case – i.e., 
( ) ( )ln 1u wh rk h ββ αγ μ −= + + −  – which is now maximised subject to the demand for work hours in 
(2), keeping r and k as given constants.10 The first order condition is   
 ( )( ) ( )
2
1
1
1
1 0
1
Ak h
h
Ak h rk
λ λ ββ α
λ λ
γ λ βμλ
−
−
−
−
−
− − =
− +
, (13.1) 
which together with the remaining two equations in h, k and r, i.e. (3) and (7), can be solved to 
determine their corresponding general equilibrium values in terms of γ, β, λ, δ, A, *r  and k . The 
solution for w is then obtained using (2). The algebraic expressions for these solutions are rather 
cumbersome and analytically unwieldy but it can be shown that, with this type of coordination, the 
optimal values of h is below (and the optimal value of w is above) that obtained in the previous 
cases.11 This is shown in Figure 4 (drawn for given δ) by point EI and comparison with the equilibrium 
solutions under basic coordination and no coordination, EB and EU respectively, shows that hI<hB<hU 
and wI>wB>wU.  Hence, by taking into account the trade-off between w and h on the demand curve, 
intermediate coordination leads to a further reduction in work hours and to a rise in the wage. The 
reason why in this case hours are lower than in the basic coordination case is that the coordinating 
agent internalises the (partial equilibrium) trade-off between employment and wage, whereby a lower 
employment (which reduces income and hence consumption) will be compensated by a higher wage.  
Analytically, as shown in more detail in Appendix 2, while the marginal utility of leisure is unaffected 
by coordination – i.e., the second term of left-hand-sides of (12.1) and (13.1) are identical – the 
marginal utility of consumption is lower under intermediate coordination, as can be seen by comparing 
the first term of the left-hand-sides of (12.1) and (13.1). Hence, h has to be lower to balance the 
marginal utilities of consumption and leisure for (12.1) and (13.1) to hold.  Figure 4 also shows the 
effects of a change in β; as expected, the higher is β the lower will be the optimal work hours (and the 
lower will be the wage rate), resulting in a bigger gap between the coordinated and uncoordinated 
solutions for w and h.  
 With respect to the role of international openness, the larger is δ the higher is the optimal h and 
hence the higher is the corresponding w, as illustrated in Figure 5 (drawn for given β). Consider the 
initial equilibrium at EI1 and let δ rise from δ1 to δ2. Ceteris paribus, we move from EI1 to 1IE′ , but the 
                                                 
10 Clearly, for any given r and k, choosing h in this context where the coordinator internalises the partial equilibrium 
demand by the firm amounts to choosing w. Put differently, the objective function can be written in terms of either h or w 
when internalising the labour demand function – it is in this sense that this case can be thought of as corresponding to the 
wage setting firm-level monopoly union.    
11 We do not present the algebraic expressions here (they are available on request) but show the general analytical proofs in 
Appendix 2. 
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increase in h reduces the utility − as w is kept constant and h is increased; see (13.1). Thus, at 1IE′  it is 
desirable for the worker if we reduce h and increase w along the new demand curve associated with a 
higher δ =δ2. The new optimal point is shown by EI2, where we have assumed that the rise in openness 
has increased both w and h, relative to their starting values at EI1.12  
 
 
3.2.1.4  Full coordination 
In this subsection the coordinating agent is assumed to have full knowledge of the economy and to 
utilise it when maximising the utility of the representative worker-consumer. This case corresponds to 
full coordination of the consumption-leisure decision and can be thought of as the ‘all-encompassing’ 
corporatist case. The utility function is as in the previous cases with coordination – i.e., 
( ) ( )ln 1u wh rk h ββ αγ μ −= + + −  – but the internalisation of the macroeconomic constraints now 
involves maximising u subject to equations (1), (2), (3), (7) and (9.1).  In general, these equations 
together with the first order condition for maximisation form a system of six equations which 
determine the general equilibrium solution for the six unknowns, y, k, r, w, h, and c. Specifically, the 
full coordination entails first using equations (1), (2), (3), (7) and (9.1) to find the solutions for y, k, r, 
w and c in terms of h, and then maximising u subject to these solutions. This yields the optimal, fully 
coordinated, values of h and w which, for the same values of the parameters and exogenous variables, 
can be shown to lie between the corresponding values obtained under the basic and the intermediate 
coordination cases, i.e., hI<hF<hB and wB<wF<wI hold (see Appendix 2) as illustrated in Figure 6.  
 The intuition behind the larger working hours and lower wage under full coordination relative 
to the intermediate coordination case is that the coordinator now takes into account the effect of work 
hours (and the associated wage level) on the interest rate and the ensuing capital inflow, and therefore 
the total size of the capital stock. Recall that, given the trade-off between wage and interest rate in (4), 
a higher wage results in a smaller interest rate and in a lower capital inflow which, ceteris paribus, 
reduces the marginal productivity of labour and lowers output. It is taking account of this mechanism, 
and hence mitigating the negative effect of a higher wage on employment and income that leads the 
coordinator in this case to set higher hours (and a lower wage) relative to the intermediate case.   
 Thus, what emerges here is an inverse U-shaped relationship between wage levels and the 
degree of coordination of labour supply decisions (to which corresponds a U-shaped relationship 
between work-hours and degree of coordination). This result offers a rationale for the evidence of the 
high work hours (per working age person) in Scandinavian economies relative to those characterising 
                                                 
12 It should be stressed that whilst wI2>wI1 always holds, hI2<hI1 is also a feasible outcome in this case. 
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less coordinated industrial relations systems in other continental European countries.13 Specifically, 
despite its stylised nature this model captures the fact that a key factor in explaining the different 
pattern of work in Scandinavian countries (relative to other European economies such as France and 
Germany) is that in these small open Nordic countries the (corporatist) social pact between the trade 
unions and the government, resulting in wage moderation, has rested on the internalisation of the 
implications of the wage and labour supply decisions on the country’s international competitiveness14 
– see, for example, Faggio and Nickell (2007) for a detailed discussion of this issue. Finally, it can be 
shown that with full coordination the impact of a change in the extent of openness and importance of 
social interaction − measured by δ and β, respectively − is qualitatively identical to that obtained with 
intermediate coordination and can be illustrated using Figures 4 and 5 above.   Figure 7 illustrates 
these points: it depicts the U-shaped relationship between work-hours and degree coordination of 
labour supply decisions and it also shows how this relationship shifts with a rise δ and β. In order to 
confront the shape of this theoretical relationship with the data, in Figure 8 we plot the fitted values 
from a (quadratic smoothing) regression of work hours on an index of centralisation of wage 
bargaining using pooled data from 18 OECD countries for the period 1970-2000.15 The graph clearly 
shows, consistent with our theoretical result, that there is a U-shaped relationship between hours 
worked and centralisation in the wage determination process.  
 
 
3.2.2. Supply of work hours with capital outflow 
We now briefly examine, for completeness, the equilibrium under capital outflow. With capital 
outflow, the demand for work hours remains the same and can be represented by Figure 1 except that 
the market equilibrium now occurs at wages above wˆ  since now *r r< .  Also, note that the relevant 
budget constraint used in this case is given by equation (9.2). 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 This result is also consistent with findings in the literature of a hump-shaped relationship between degree of bargaining 
coordination and the distortionary effects of unionisation, e.g. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Freeman (1988), who focus 
on employment, and Summers et al. (1993) and Alesina and Perotti (1997), who examine the role of taxation and fiscal 
policy. 
14 The policy of wage restrains that has accompanied the lifting of controls on foreign direct investment and has resulted in 
a higher competitiveness is often referred to as a key factor explaining the rebound in Sweden’s current account deficit in 
the 1990s.  
15 This index of bargaining centralization is the interpolated version of that provided in Table 3.5 of OECD (2004). It is 
within the range [1,5] and increasing in the degree of centralization. The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom and United States. We have taken the series from Nickell (2006) which provides a comprehensive 
description of the series used in different studies.  
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3.2.2.1. No coordination  
Following the same procedure as in the capital inflow case, the first order condition for utility 
maximisation is  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
* 1 01 1 1
w h
wh r k x x
ββ αγ αμδ
−
−
− − =
+ − − −
, (11.2) 
where ( )
(1 ) / 1/ (1 ) /
*
1 A w
x
r
λ λ λ λ λλ λ − − −−
= .16 (11.2) is the general equilibrium locus of combinations of h 
and w on the uncoordinated supply. Unlike its counterpart under capital inflow, i.e. (11.1), it depends 
on the extent of openness through δ  and becomes steeper the larger is δ  within the relevant range 
where w > wˆ .17 Also, since a rise in β  shifts the supply locus to the left, in this case too a higher 
leisure externality leads to a reduction in work-hours supplied at the same wage.  Thus: (i) for any 
given β, the more open is the economy, the lower are the equilibrium values of w and h; (ii) for any 
given δ, the stronger is the leisure externality the lower is the equilibrium h and the higher is the 
corresponding w.  
 
3.2.2.2. Impact of coordination  
 With internalisation of the leisure externality and taking account of equations (5), (6) and (9.2) 
the objective function is 
 ( )( ) ( )*ln 1u wh rk r r k h ββ αγ μ −= + + − + −  , (14) 
which will be the same in all coordination cases.  
 With basic coordination, the first order condition for maximising (14) yields the following 
general equilibrium supply locus of combinations of h and w  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
* 1 01 1 1
w h
wh r k x x
ββ αγ βμδ
−
−
− − =
+ − − −
. (12.2) 
Again, unlike its counterpart under capital inflow – i.e., (12.1) – this locus depends on the extent of 
openness and its graph is similar to (11.2) in the (h,w) space except that, for all given parameter 
values, it lies to its left; however, as in the capital inflow case, a rise in β  shifts the curve to the left. 
                                                 
16 Note that x<1 as long as *r r< . 
17 It is straightforward to verify that the loci corresponding different values of δ are tangent at w = wˆ  corresponding to 
*r r= , but become steeper (flatter) the larger is δ  as w > wˆ  (w < wˆ ). Also, for very large values of δ the locus bends 
backwards at some high value of w> wˆ  but this occurs above the intersection with demand for the same δ and does not lead 
to multiple equilibria.  
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Thus, as in the capital inflow case: (i) compared with the no-coordination case, for any given δ and β, 
basic coordination reduces the equilibrium value of h and raises the corresponding value of w; as in 
the no-coordination case, (ii) for any given β, the more open is the economy the lower are the 
equilibrium values of w and h; and (iii) for any given δ, the stronger is the social interaction 
externality the lower is the equilibrium value of h and the higher is the corresponding value of w.  
 Moving to intermediate coordination, the objective function in (14) is maximised subject to the 
demand for work hours in (2) taking as given r and k.  The first order condition is   
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2
1
1 *
1
1 0
1
Ak h
h
Ak h rk r k k
λ λ ββ α
λ λ
γ λ βμ
λ
−
−
−
−
−
− − =
− + + −
, (13.2) 
which together with (2), (3) and (7) can be solved to determine the general equilibrium values of w, h, 
k and r. Again, we find hI<hB<hU and wI>wB>wU which are qualitatively identical to the results 
obtained with capital inflow. In addition, in common with the uncoordinated and basic cases, we find 
that (i) for any given δ, the stronger are social interactions the lower is the equilibrium value of h and 
the higher is the corresponding value of w; and (ii) for any given β, the more open is the economy the 
lower are the equilibrium values of w and h.  
 Finally, with full coordination, (14) is maximised subject to the solution of (1), (2), (3) and (7) 
for y, k, r and w in terms of h. We find the same qualitative results obtained under capital inflow, 
namely hI<hF<hB<hU  and wI>wF>wB>wU to hold, supporting the existence of an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between wages (and a U-shaped relationship between work hours) and degree of 
coordination. Also, as in the intermediate coordination case, we find that (i) for any given δ, the higher 
is β the lower is the equilibrium value of h and the higher is the corresponding value of w; and (ii) for 
any given β, the higher is δ  the lower are the equilibrium values of both w and h.  
 
3.3  Welfare effects of coordination  
In this section we examine the welfare effects of coordination in the labour supply-wage decision of 
workers. We do this by comparing the values of the maximised utilities corresponding to different 
cases, denoted with V. It is straightforward to show that coordination increases welfare in that, under 
both capital inflow and outflow, the higher is the degree of coordination the larger is V – i.e., for any 
given β and δ, VF>VI>VB>VU always holds. Also, for any given δ, in all cases V is always increasing in 
β,  as expected. Finally, with respect to the role of openness, we find that, for any given β, the higher 
is δ the larger is V when there is capital inflow. But with capital outflow, this result does not always 
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hold since in this case a rise in δ lowers both h and w and V falls if the net effect of the fall in wage 
income dominates in the indirect utility function.18  
 
4. Conclusions  
This paper has examined how openness interacts with the coordination of consumption-leisure 
decisions in determining the equilibrium working hours and wage rate when there are leisure 
externalities stemming from social interactions.   
 Coordination takes the form of internalising the leisure externality and other relevant 
constraints and leads to a lower equilibrium working hours and a higher wage rate. However, the 
impact of coordination on hours and wage is not monotonic, as we find a U-shaped relationship 
between hours worked and the degree of coordination of the labour supply decisions (to which 
corresponds and inverse-U-shaped relationship between wages and degree of coordination).  We also 
find that the gap between the equilibrium coordinated and uncoordinated labour supply (and the 
corresponding wage rates) is affected by the extent of globalisation. In particular, for countries that are 
net importers of capital (and have a positive trade balance) raising the degree of openness increases 
both the labour supply and the wage rate – although with intermediate levels of coordination labour 
supply may also reduce.  Finally, we find that coordination is welfare improving and that the existence 
of leisure externality enhances this improvement.  
 The key results of the paper, on the whole, are in line with the empirical observation that, 
relative to other European countries, the Scandinavian countries – characterised by more coordinated 
systems of industrial relations – have higher work hours per working age person. More generally, as 
we showed, preliminary evidence suggests the existence of a U-shaped relationship between hours 
worked and degree of centralisation of the wage setting process in OECD countries. Further 
explorations in this direction would go beyond the aims of this paper. Our results suggest, however, 
that further research is required – both at the empirical and theoretical level – to highlight the 
interaction between labour market institutions, openness, and working time patterns.      
                                                 
18 Our calculations show that the fall in V due to the rise in openness emerges with intermediate coordination, as in this 
case wh falls substantially relative to the other coordination cases. 
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Appendix 2  
This appendix proves the existence of a U-shaped relationship between work hours and the 
degree of coordination, i.e. hI<hF<hB. We focus on the capital inflow case but the same 
approach can be used to show the result to hold also when there is capital outflow. For 
convenience, we replace equations (2), (4) to (7) and (10) respectively with (A1) to (A5) 
below which rewrite the latter equations in general form and specify the sign of their relevant 
partial derivatives:  
 ( ) ( ) (1 ), ; 1 0hw w h k w Ak hλ λλ λ − += = − − <  (A1) 
 ( ) ( )
1/
1
; 0w
A
r r w r
w
λλ−⎛ ⎞
= = − <⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (A2) 
 ( ) ( ); 0, 0, 0, 0c cc e eeu v c e v v= + > < > <A A A  (A3) 
 ( ) *; 0r kk k r k r
δ
= = >   (A4) 
 ( ); 0hw g h g= < 19    (A5) 
 The general problem is to choose h to maximise u in (A5), the first order condition 
(FOC) for which is:  0c e
dc dev
dh dh
+ =A .  Since 1de
dh
= − , the FOC can be written as 
 c e
dcv
dh
= A  (A6) 
which states the equality between marginal utilities of consumption and leisure due to a 
change in h.  
 With basic coordination, we impose the budget constraint in (9.1), c wh rk= + , and 
take w and r as given, hence dc w
dh
=  and (A6) implies  
 c ev w = A . (A7) 
 With intermediate coordination, we impose c wh rk= +  as well as ( ),w w h k=  in 
(A2) and take k and r as given, hence ( )c w h h rk= ⋅ +  and hdc w w hdh = + . Therefore, (A6) 
implies 
                                                 
19 Note that although equation (10) is written such that h is a function of w, the underlying function is 
monotonically decreasing one and hence the inverse function in (A5) exists.    
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 ( )c h ev w w h+ = A . (A8) 
 With full coordination, we impose c wh rk= +  as well as ( )r r w=  and ( )w g h=  in 
(A4) and (A10). Thus, ( ) ( )( )c g h h r g h k= ⋅ + ⋅  and h w hdc w g h r g kdh = + + , and (A6) implies 
 ( )c h w h ev w g h r g k+ + = A . (A9) 
 The right-hand-sides of (A7), (A8) and (A9) are identical. Comparing the left-hand-
sides of these, it can be shown that (see below)  
 h h w hw w h w g h r g k w+ < + + < , (A10) 
which implies:  
(i)  The value of h which solves (A8) will have to be lower than that which solves (A7) 
so as to yield a relatively lower marginal utility of leisure, since hw w h w+ < , hence 
hI<hB;  
(ii) The value of h which solves (A9) will have to be lower than that which solves (A7) 
so as to yield a relatively lower marginal utility of leisure, since 
h w hw g h r g k w+ + < , hence hF<hB; 
(iii)  The value of h which solves (A8) will have to be lower than that which solves (A8) 
so as to yield a relatively lower marginal utility of leisure, since 
h h w hw w h w g h r g k+ < + + , hence hI<hF. 
From these, hI<hF <hB follows.   
 To see that (A10) holds, first note that hw w h w+ <  always holds since 0hw <  does. 
Thus we need to establish 0h h w hw h g h r g k< + <  to ensure (A10).  To do so, given that  
0hg <  and 0hw < , we show that / 1h hw g >  and that with constant returns to scale 
1 1 / 0wr k h> + >  holds. These, together with hw w h w+ < , are sufficient for (A10) to hold.   
 That / 1h hw g >  holds can be verified algebraically by comparing derivatives of (10) 
and (2). However, to retain generality here we invoke intuition to explain the reason why the 
partial equilibrium demand for work hours in (A1) in the (h, w) space ought to be steeper than 
the general equilibrium locus in (A5). Consider Figure A below which sketches graphs of two 
partial equilibrium demands corresponding to two different levels of capital. Suppose that 
point D is also on the general equilibrium locus.  Let hours drop from h to h′  but keep wage 
intact at w, hence moving to point B. This drop in hours has two effects. First, it increases the 
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marginal product of labour. Hence, if nothing else changes, at B there is excess demand for 
hours and firms are willing to pay w″.  But the drop in hours also reduces the marginal 
product of capital. This shifts the partial equilibrium demand for capital down in the (k,r) 
space. Since the position of supply of capital is not affected, both r and k fall along the supply 
of capital as demand for capital shifts down. This fall in k, however, shifts the partial 
equilibrium demand for hours in the (h,w) space down, say, to that shown by (A1′). The point 
on the general equilibrium locus corresponding to h′  will be on (A1′). Thus, the general 
equilibrium locus will pass through D and D′  and will be flatter that any partial equilibrium 
demand it crosses.   
 
 
  
 
 To show that 1 1 / 0wr k h> + > , first recall that 0wr <  and hence 1 1 /wr k h> +  are 
always satisfied. To verify 1 / 0wr k h+ >  rewrite it as: ( ) ( )( )/ / /wr h k k k h k− < = . With a 
homogenous, constant returns to scale production function, perfect competition implies that 
firms substitute the two factors such that the elasticity of r with respect to w, ,r wε , is a 
constant equal to the factor cost ratio /wh rk φ= ; in this case, with the Cobb-Douglas 
function in (1), ( ), 1 //
w
r w
r wh
r w rk
ε λ λ≡ − = = −  –  see equations (2), (3) and (4). This implies 
/ /wr h k h k− = < , as required since k k>  with capital inflow.  
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(A1):  partial equilibrium 
demand with k=k1 
(A1′):  partial equilibrium 
demand with k = k2 < k1 
Fig. A.  Partial equilibrium demand for hours and the corresponding 
general equilibrium locus  
general equilibrium locus 
